Policing Critique by ROELE, IH






Isobel Roele,  
Queen May University of London 
 
 
Review article of Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon, & Alexis Galán, The Law of 
International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
 
Keywords: Hermeneutics-of-suspicion; international law; critical theory; fiction; 
Koskenniemi  
 
Abstract: Can fiction fan the spark of hope in Martti Koskenniemi’s critical international law 
writings? In the course of a critical reading of Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon, & Alexis 
Galán, The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), this review article argues against the hermeneutics of suspicion and for a more 
reparative approach to doing international law critically. Drawing on work in Literary 
Studies, it identifies the limiting effects suspicion has on critique and suggests that fiction 
offers a way of grounding abstract concepts and thinking through their detailed 
implications. It illustrates this technique by reading Koskenniemi’s thinly drawn figure of the 
critical professional alongside the trope of the maverick cop in TV police procedurals, with 





What is critique? For Martti Koskenniemi, the subject of this collection of essays and ‘one of 
the icons’ of international law (9), it is to say ‘no’. He provides an epilogue to this volume of 
critical readings of his work which responds to the contributors in a series of noes – no to 
abstraction, no to empiricism, no to constructivism, no to enchantment – but ends in a 
tantalising ‘perhaps’. Perhaps it is possible to do international law work critically. Who is this 
critical professional? What are moral instincts? How can we introduce them into our 
professional lives? For all Koskenniemi’s noes, we never find out. 
 
Editors Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon and Alexis Galán have a different approach to 
critique or, rather, criticism. They have compiled a set of readings of Koskenniemi’s work 
which sets out to ‘challeng[e] and deeply engag[e]’ his writing (9). Even the more robust 
readings affirm more than they negate because of the respect close attention pays to 
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scholarly writing. Assembling a formidable line-up to reveal ‘fresh perspectives’, on well-
known ideas (10), the editors set out to recuperate Koskenniemi’s over-used oeuvre for 
serious scholarship. Contributors pay particular attention to the indeterminacy thesis, the 
culture of formalism, counter-disciplinarily and his turn to history. Although the editors have 
taken pains to represent a ‘wide range of functional areas’ and ‘even broader range of 
theoretical perspectives’ (10), it is a shame the range of voices is so narrow – most of the 
contributors are white men from institutions in the global North.  
 
Inspired by the volume’s generous, appreciative project, I approach Koskenniemi’s negative 
critique with a view to opening it up rather than shutting it down. This essay takes critique 
as an act of reclamation,1 reclaiming Koskenniemi’s assertion of international lawyers’ moral 
agency from the sea of noes that overwhelm the redemptive impulse. Hi epilogue, ‘To 
Enable and Enchant – on the Power of International law’, is awash with refusal. Abstraction 
enchants, it says, and must be apprehended and interrogated wherever it is found, whether 
in positivism, high theory, empiricism, or constructivism. The techniques, frame and 
disposition of this critique are a product of Koskenniemi’s professed commitment to the 
hermeneutics of suspicion (396). Valuable though it is, suspicion is only one mode of 
critique and one that we may have good reason to set aside when it inhibits other projects 
especially those which, in Anne Orford’s phrase, may prove ‘enlivening, productive and 
critically transformative’ (304).  
 
Koskenniemi’s own critically transformative project, which presses international lawyers to 
take responsibility for their work and follow their ‘gut feelings’ (411), rather than blindly 
comply with management directives, falls victim to the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Koskenniemi is convinced that ‘it would be wrong to simply dispense with international law 
altogether’ (410), but he cannot tell us how to find out what our moral sensibilities are 
saying, or decide when we ought to follow them. To do so would be to truck with 
abstraction and this is verboten. As Eve Sedgwick showed, suspicion says no absolutely, 
without exception. Her alternative was to read reparatively.2 How might we read 
Koskenniemi’s work reparatively? Literary studies, Sedgwick’s home discipline, suggests 
some possibilities. Here I draw in particular on Rita Felski’s The Limits of Critique3 to 
understand how the narratives of suspicion – its structural biases, we might say - police the 
limits of critique and prevent Koskenniemi from fanning what Marks and Lang call ‘the spark 
of hope’ in his work.  
 
I attempt to kindle the spark with other, fictional, narratives. Fictions allow us read more 
detail into Koskenniemi’s waifish gestures, opening them to critical appreciation not 
                                                      
1 Wendy Brown, Edgework (Princeton University Press, 2005) 21 
2 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re so paranoid, you probably think 
this essay is about you’ in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling (Duke University Press, 2003) 
3 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago University Press, 2015) 
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shutting them down. What is Koskenniemi getting at when he advocates moral agency? 
What does he have in mind when he talks about moral sentiments? Where might such an 
approach take us in the future? I turn to the fictional narratives of the police procedural to 
bring Koskenniemi’s figure of the critical professional to life, drawing on the HBO series The 
Wire to imagine them as maverick cops. 
 
1. The Hermeneutics of suspicion 
 
Koskenniemi declares that his critique is driven by the hermeneutics of suspicion (396). The 
term is usually credited to Paul Ricoeur, who used it to affirm the suspicious thinking of 
Freud, Marx and Nietzsche. He thought they were united by three things: a shared suspicion 
of false consciousness, a method of deciphering it; and a goal of substituting it with a better 
mode of consciousness.4 Koskenniemi fits this bill, too. He tackles false-consciousness head-
on in his epilogue by suggesting that law has an ‘enchanting power’ that obscures the work 
international lawyers do to transform power into authority (393); he crafted structuralist 
and historical methods of deciphering this transformation in From Apology to Utopia and 
The Gentle Civilizer, respectively; and finally, he (re)turned to Kant, admonishing 
international lawyers to exercise their moral agency by self-consciously reflecting on their 
actions and, more lately, to Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, counselling us to 
follow our ‘gut instincts’ (411) casting justice as ‘a ‘fleeting sensation’ about a wrong having 
been committed’ (410). 
 
In her work on the hermeneutics of suspicion in literary criticism, Felski has shown how 
critical scholars use the metaphors of ‘digging down and standing back’ to explain their ways 
of seeing.5 The piercing gaze of the former method discovers concealed meanings and the 
wide-angle lens of the latter defamiliarises the object of critique by placing it in a new 
context. Koskenniemi has employed both techniques in his scholarship as styles, if not 
methods.6 We can read From Apology as an excavation of the deep structure beneath the 
practice of international law argumentation. He used ‘deconstruction’ to perform a 
‘regressive analysis’ and uncover the ‘deep structure’ of international law argument.7 The 
Gentle Civilizer digs down into the detail of international law argument by re-describing the 
positions that had appeared ‘flat’ in the structure of legal argumentation as rounder 
commitments that carried political valences in particular contexts.8 
 
                                                      
4 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (Yale University Press, 1970) 34-35 
5 Felski, n 3 above, n 3 above, 52-84 
6 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the editors of the symposium’ (1999) 93(2) AJIL 351 
7 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argumentation (CUP, 2005) 
6 
8 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP, 
2002), 8 
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In the epilogue to the present volume, Koskenniemi argues that law’s ‘enchanting power’ 
comes from its ability to conceal power relations by asserting that its processes are ruled by 
law not men (393). Hegemonic power is all the more insidious because it claims legitimacy, 
which it gets inter alia from international law. As ‘a product of a colonialist history and a 
hopeless legitimizer of an unequal world’, Koskenniemi believes that ‘the law won’t save 
anybody’ (410). While international law argumentation may be, in the abstract, 
indeterminate, in practice decisions are the product of institutions’ structural bias and the 
unequal power relations of an unjust world.  
 
Koskenniemi does not advocate abandoning international law, but he sees little cause for 
hope. International law is not for progressive projects. International lawyers must be 
fatalistic and accept that it will be used for conservative purposes, while remaining 
strategically attuned to the possibility of leveraging features of formal law for political 
struggles of resistance and emancipation. International law can only become politically 
opposable to hegemony and conservativism if international lawyers accept that political 
engagement is part of their international law practice, thereby regaining their ‘autonomy 
and legitimate political contestation’ and ‘sense of choice and responsibility’ (402). Two 
things stand in the way of this: Doctrine peddles the myth that law is autonomous from 
power and managerialism makes functionaries of international lawyers, generating 
‘unreflective support of the structural bias within a particular expert discourse’.9 Neither 
approach allows for international lawyers to be politically engaged.  
 
Suspicion is an all-or-nothing enterprise. Koskenniemi is not wrong to be wary of 
international law, but he shoots himself in the foot because suspicion is his only mode of 
critique. Suspicion is valuable because it helps us see our field differently; what was once 
thought benign is shown to be troubling, what was once taken-for-granted is shown to be 
contingent, what was once familiar is shown to be strange. In international law the 
authority of law can be bought by the highest bidder and, as he and others tirelessly – and 
rightly – remind us, it is an export of the global North – a Eurocentric product foisted on the 
rest of the world (as Obregón discusses in Chapter 14). Koskenniemi is also right to demand 
that we notice how international law obscures unequal power relations, injustice and 
suffering – and he is certainly right to press us to recognise how we international lawyers 
contribute to obscurantism and to tenaciously refuse to do so. But there is more to life than 
being right – particularly when, as Sedgwick shows, one inhabits a paranoid position, 
characteristic of which is the desire to avoid ‘bad surprises’ by anticipating bad news.10 
Bringing an end to the ‘excruciating uncertainty’11 of indeterminacy, but replacing it with 
                                                      
9 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law 
and Globalization’ (2007) 8(9) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9-36, 17 
10 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 130-131 
11 Felski, n 3 above, 39 
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fatalistic despair, Sedgwick shows that the hermeneutics of suspicion is no more realistic or 
less delusional than the Utopian scholarship it critiques.12  
 
2. Antinormative normativity 
 
Suspicious critique is not a marginal enterprise in international law. As the editors of the 
collection point out, Koskenniemi’s approach is part of the mainstream - it even forms the 
basis of a textbook (2).13 Harvard Law School’s Institute for Global Law and Policy has also 
done much to disseminate the approach through its network and its residential fellowship 
programmes. The editors dub its Faculty Director, David Kennedy, Koskenniemi’s ‘sparring 
mate’ (6). These initiatives attest to suspicious critique’s ‘infinitely doable and teachable 
protocols of unveiling’14 and ‘protocols of professional pessimism’,15 but they are hardly 
indoctrination programmes. How does suspicion sustain its compliance pull? Felski explains 
that its persuasive and normative force come from the narratives it tells. She shows how 
suspicious critique uses the detective story form to raise expectations, frame views and 
establish conditions of plausibility. Other narratives sound like fabulous tales of 
‘complacency, credulity and conservativism’.16 
 
This section presents the ‘antinormative normativity’ of the hermeneutics of suspicion, to 
use Felski’s phrase. This ‘skepticism as dogma’17 is apparent in Koskenniemi’s responses to 
some of the contributors of the volume under review and I use these reactions to illustrate 
the restrictive effects of the hermeneutics of suspicion in action. The first considers explicit 
forms of normativity and the second implicit ones.  
 
a) The Law of international lawyers 
 
Although the editors do not make the valence explicit, it is hard not to read the title of this 
collection, The Law of International Lawyers, as a reference to Koskenniemi’s own status as 
an authority figure in the discipline. No doubt it also refers to the focus on international 
lawyers in Koskenniemi’s writing, but the editors give so much air-time to ‘the growing 
‘mainstreaming’ of critical international law’ (2), that the temptation to draw the 
connection is irresistible. Of course, laying down the law is the last thing that critique wants 
to be seen to do. Foucault thought it ‘incapable of laying down the law’, though he admitted 
that it ‘wants very much to police’.18 Orford calls Koskenniemi out for doing precisely this, 
                                                      
12 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 150 
13 Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP, 2013) 
14 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 143 
15 Felski, n 3 above, 128 
16 ibid, 8 
17 ibid, 9 
18 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’ in J. Schmidt (ed.) What is Enlightenment? (University of California 
Press, 1996), 383 
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squeezing out and shutting down ‘enlivening, productive and critically transformative’ work 
(304). Koskenniemi does this in two ways: by prohibiting abstraction and prescribing 
contextualisation.  
 
i. Prohibiting abstraction 
 
In one of the most hard-headed critiques in the collection, Nikolas Rajkovic turns the 
weapon of suspicious critique against Koskenniemi’s rejection of the interdisciplinary 
agenda of international law and relations.19 Rajkovic says no to Koskenniemi’s 
counterdisciplinarity, suggesting that he uses the concept to ‘orientalize’ the discipline of 
International Relations by asserting ‘a positional superiority’ (170). He maps disciplinary 
space and accuses Koskenniemi of having a ‘territorial mind-set’ (186) that ‘fails to grasp 
how all disciplinary space is profoundly abstract, overlapping and non-terrestrial’ (170).  
 
Responding to these criticisms, Koskenniemi does not mention the wince-inducing use of 
Edward Said’s work to defend a discipline created, to quote Susan Pedersen, ‘to figure out 
how to preserve white supremacy in a multiracial and increasingly interdependent world’.20 
Instead, his response focuses on the ‘enchanting abstraction’ of Rajkovic’s critique and 
suggests that a better reference than Orientalism would have been Said’s Culture and 
Imperialism, which shows how ‘theoretical abstraction operates at the service of [] 
ideological machinery’ (399). Koskenniemi reiterates his opposition to the ‘wholly 
positivistic discipline’ of International Relations and its love of ‘methodological 
abstraction…so as to enlist the power of scientific vocabularies to reach the prince’s ear’ 
(400). Koskenniemi’s prohibition of this sort of work is categorical – no more abstraction. 
 
Abstraction inhabits other, less obvious places too. In his chapter, Eric Posner sets out to 
supply the missing empirical evidence to bear out Koskenniemi’s critique of human rights 
law (124). Posner’s empirical conclusions may support Koskenniemi’s theoretical work, but 
Koskenniemi cannot support the claim to scientific objectivity made by empirical 
methodology. He has long been unforgiving of the way empirical sociology obscures its 
abstract premises under layers of data and findings.21 Given the consistency of 
Koskenniemi’s opposition to this sort of scholarship, it is no surprise that in response to 
Posner he reiterates the position that ‘social science imposes its unacknowledged values 
and choices on the world it seeks to rule in the name of what it thinks of as incontestably 
“real”’ (400). Built on abstraction, empirics enchant too, and Koskenniemi categorically 
rejects them. 
                                                      
19 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’ 
(2012) 26(1) International Relations 3-34 
20 Susan Pedersen, ‘Destined to Disappear’ (Oct 2016) 38(20) London Review of Books 23. Pedersen reviewed 
White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations by Robert Vitalis 
(Cornell University Press, 2015) 
21 Koskenniemi, n 7 above, 524 
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ii. Prescribing contextualism 
 
Koskenniemi polices international law work by prescription as well as prohibition. In her 
chapter, Orford worries that his insistence on contextualising (301), effectively shuts down 
any project that does not respect strict historical method and its periodisations.22 She says 
history-as-method uses the slurs of anachronism and ahistoricism to dismiss attempts by 
international lawyers to engage with the past and to prevent those who do engage with it 
from ‘interven[ing] in the development of the law’ and moving it towards a ‘less repressive 
future’ (312). Her criticisms find an echo in Felski’s work, which argues that treating history 
as a box cages ‘the transtemporal liveliness of texts’.23 While New Historicism has worked 
hard to emphasise ‘the historicity of texts and the textuality of history’, it ‘leans towards 
diagnosis rather than dialogue’ and tends to ‘quarantin[e] difference, deny[] relatedness 
and suspend[]…the questions of why past texts matter and how they speak to us now’.24 
New Historicism crossed with suspicion, in other words, equals negative critique. 
 
Koskenniemi responds that he does not recognize himself in Orford’s critique. He does not 
share ‘the positivist separation between the past and the present’ (406) and has previously 
criticised ‘full-scale contextualism’ for insisting ‘on the separation of chronologically distant 
moments from each other and the illegitimacy of producing judgments across contextual 
boundaries’.25 This, he implies, amounts to methodological abstraction and, as we have just 
seen, Koskenniemi will not tolerate any method that claims to establish objective facts.26 
This response, however, does not quite address Orford’s point. After all, Koskenniemi’s 
work has been consistently contextual. The Gentle Civilizer, for example, was an express 
attempt to resituate disciplinary debate in historical context after the generalities of From 
Apology. Koskenniemi said his earlier ‘formal-structural analysis’ had presented ‘an image of 
the law [that] remained rather static’ because ‘it did not situate the lawyers whose work it 
described within social or political contexts, to give a sense that they were advancing or 
opposing particular political projects’.27 The introduction of the concept of structural bias in 
the second edition of From Apology brought abstracted legal argumentation into 
institutional contexts.28 Given this ambivalence, perhaps it is best to heed Koskenniemi’s 
advice that ‘it is often better not to define but to show what one means’ (398), and look at 
how he treats context in the epilogue. 
                                                      
22 See also, Anne Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’ (2013) 1(1), London Review of International Law 
166–197 
23 Felski, n 3 above, 154 
24 ibid, 156 
25 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’ (2014) 22 Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte 119-138, 129 
26 See also, Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’ 
27 Koskenniemi, n 8 above, 1-2 
28 Koskenniemi, n 7 above, 600 
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Many of the volume’s contributors mention the culture of formalism Koskenniemi 
introduced at the end of The Gentle Civilizer. It captured international lawyers’ imaginations 
and raised their hopes. Toope and Brunée, for example, use it as a jumping-off point for 
their Lon Fuller-inspired ‘culture of legality (139). Koskenniemi recontextualises the concept 
in the epilogue, pruning it back hard and cutting off the unruly shoots which it has sprouted. 
He explains that the culture of formalism was embodied in Wolfgang Friedmann, a professor 
of law at Columbia University who used formalist arguments to oppose US interventionism 
in the 1960s. Koskenniemi makes clear that the righteousness of Friedmann’s actions were 
in the man, not the law - the culture of formalism itself is not a guarantee of emancipatory 
politics.29 He says he was conducting an experiment – ‘to examine the possibility of a legal 
practice beyond the purely strategic’ (398). Back-pedaling or not, Koskenniemi’s reading of 
his own work here is undeniably contextualist.  
 
Perhaps one reason for cycling back on the culture of formalism lies in his desire to respond 
to Samuel Moyn’s (suspicious) critique. Moyn suggests Koskenniemi’s grasp of context is 
insufficiently sophisticated because it ‘failed to situate international law within a larger set 
of actual and possible modes of politics’. The Gentle Civilizer was ‘a romance of international 
law as a saving grace in the face of otherwise unconstrained power’ (341). Koskenniemi 
refutes this accusation by reasserting his commitment to context. He denies suggesting that 
formal international law should be central to political thought in general, saying his 
preference for ‘(Left) neo-formalism’ applied only to ‘domestic and international 
institutions’ in which international law is already present. In these contexts, neo-formalism 
offers ‘a way to think about the power and limits of […] professional commitments and the 
role of moral and political responsibility’ (405). 
 
Koskenniemi’s commitment to context is not only a question of historical method. He is also 
concerned with present-day contexts and affirms the importance of critical sociology as a 
way of accessing them. Mégret gently suggests Koskenniemi is ‘a less dedicated sociologist’ 
than historian,30 who could learn from Bourdieu. This could provide the missing ‘sense of 
social reality’ that explains ‘the actual determinacy of international law despite conditions 
of indeterminacy’ (267-8). Koskenniemi accepts the criticism, agreeing that a ‘critical 
sociology [is] indispensable’ for examining the ‘historical and institutional structures, 
systems or knowledge and practice’ (402). Unlike Posner’s empiricism, critical sociology is 
valuable because of its ‘reflexivity…its ability to turn its gaze on the subject…shaking the 
certainty of disciplinary practices’ (290). It has a disenchanting effect, disrupting the way law 
‘makes us believe that things are right or wrong, true or false’ (393). Past or present, 
Bourdieusian fields or historical contexts, Koskenniemi states that ‘[t]he task is to try to see 
                                                      
29 Below, s. 2(b) 
30 Posner is also somewhat disparaging about Koskenniemi’s ‘ad hoc empiricism’ (133) 
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present legal professionalism in its context’ (402). Orford’s critique, I would say, finds its 
mark. 
 
When Koskenniemi dismissed the ‘full-scale contextualism’ of historical method, his concern 
was not to move towards a less repressive future, but to enable critical international 
lawyers to use history as a means of resistance without having to ‘accept the standpoint of 
»universal justice«’.31 Rejecting this standpoint means accepting that ‘the law won’t save 
anybody’ and living with the small comfort that ‘it might be possible to use it for a good 
purpose’ (410).  We can only do so on condition we are fully conscious of the power 
relations at play in the moment of use. Koskenniemi contemplates the transtemporal use of 
history as a political strategy, judging such uses by whether they ‘contribute to 
emancipation today’.32  
 
Whether or not he agrees with Frederic Jameson – who is often associated with New 
Historicism - that Marxism holds the key to a philosophy of history that respects the 
specificity of the past while disclosing its solidarity with the present day,33 is a matter for 
another article. His work seems, nevertheless, to share Jameson’s commitment to ‘the 
priority of the political interpretation’ of texts.34 Politics is always contextual – something is 
at stake here and now, there and then. The hermeneutics of suspicion are political in the 
mode of guerilla struggle. Longer term politicking is associated with moderates and 
conservatives. ‘[C]ritical international law is perhaps not reducible to abstract discourses, 
methods or ‘principles’’ (411), Koskenniemi writes at the end of his epilogue. Its 
interventions are determined by the heat of this battle or that insurgency. It is ruled by 
tactical and strategic realities and its field of vision is limited by lowering battlefield horizons 
which block out imagined futures. 
 
b) Telling tales 
 
Rule by fiat is only one way of propagating norms. Suspicious critique also normalises 
through its narratives. Felski depicts suspicious critics ‘as writers of certain kinds of narrative 
scripts’ - specifically detective fiction.35 Narratives condition us to expect certain outcomes, 
to attribute certain motives or interests to the characters and to read ambiguity in particular 
ways. When a discipline comes to expect a certain narrative arc, alternative stories seem 
out-of-place and out-dated, like the Bildungsromans Koskenniemi associates with the long-
gone imaginary of Rolin and other fin-de-siècle jurists.36  
                                                      
31 Koskenniemi, n 25 above, 123 
32 ibid, 129 
33 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Cornell University Press, 
1981), 2 
34 ibid, 1 
35 Felski, n 3 above, 89 
36 Koskenniemi, n 8 above, 79 
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International law is replete with culpability narratives, from immunity to impunity to stories 
of self-incrimination, in which international lawyers confess to the crimes of the discipline. 
We even use the language of detectives to describe our academic work; we interrogate 
texts, conduct investigations, make inquiries and collect evidence.37 Political convictions 
mutate into criminal convictions in Koskenniemi’s epilogue, which is all about taking 
responsibility for international law. The dark-side of the moral agency he prescribes is 
criminal responsibility – guilt. While the detective of the whodunit is looking for a single 
culprit, in suspicious critique, ‘guilt is always collective and social – the result of unethical 
structures rather than immoral persons’.38 In culpability narratives the detective, says Felski, 
is always ‘braced for bad news’ and undertakes their investigation ‘in a spirit of heightened 
mistrust’.39 This mirrors the paranoia of the hermeneutics of suspicion, which anticipate the 
worst. As well-versed readers, we come to critical international law work ready to be 
shocked, but also willing to accept the news that we ourselves are implicated or complicit in 
hegemony and injustice. 
 
A preference for bad news over good is evident in Koskenniemi’s exchange with David 
Dyzenhaus. Dyzenhaus challenges Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy thesis, suggesting that it 
corresponds to a ‘mistaken belief’ that anti-formalism is ‘empirical fact about the world’ 
(40). Koskenniemi’s response reiterates his structural bias argument; an argument will be 
considered good depending ‘on the audience or the institution operating as any institution 
does, by reference to its embedded bias’ (397). For Koskenniemi, any decision must be the 
result of anti-formalism because formalism is empty and cannot determine argument. 
International law’s universalism comes from seeing legal form as a ‘flat, substanceless 
surface’.40 Formal law is not so much a level playing field, as a sprung floor for a perpetual 
pas des deux.  
 
Dyzenhaus seeks determination without power in Habermas’ idea of the forceless force of 
better argument (50). The equation does not compute for Koskenniemi because the better 
argument is valid according to the power relations that constitute the discourse in question. 
If the moment of decision, the point at which legal argument is determined, could be 
photographed, it would yield a snapshot of unequal power relations. Foucault tells us that 
decisions only happen when power relations are caught off-balance. But to suggest, as 
Koskenniemi seems to, that these moments amount to hegemony – which is akin to 
Foucault’s idea of the state of domination, a particular case of power relations that have 
become fixed and immobile – is to write institutions off by projecting this constellation into 
the future, a template that reproduces its result over and over again. This would indeed 
                                                      
37 Felski makes a similar point about literary critics and the ‘language of guilt and complicity’, n 3 above, 86 
38 ibid, 90 
39 ibid, 88 and 91 
40 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What is international law for?’ in The Politics of International Law (Hart, 2011), 256 
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amount to a situation in which power relations had become ‘frozen, blocked’,41 but it does 
not mean they could not be otherwise in the future. 
 
Critique suffers from confirmation bias. Like all good detective stories, its starting point is 
the commission of a crime. Even when a smoking gun has not been unearthed, critique 
operates in the future anterior – a crime will have been committed. As Derrida puts it, what 
is to come (a-venir) ‘can only be anticipated in the form of an absolute danger’.42 In states of 
ambivalence, then, the next wrong lurks just around the corner. This fear resonates with 
Sedgwick’s idea of suspicious critique as a form of paranoid reading. The paranoiac wants to 
eliminate bad surprises and that this requires that ‘bad news be always already known’ 
because they cannot risk being caught off-guard in the future.43  
 
The contributions by Jaye Ellis, Toope and Brunée and Nigel White adopt a different 
narrative structure. Instead of uncovering a crime, they look forward towards what is to 
come and see hope and opportunity in the empty spaces of neo-formalism and 
argumentative indeterminacy. Writing about peace negotiations, White draws on 
Habermasean intersubjectivity to suggest that international law, though too indeterminate 
to resolve the dispute itself, operates as a stabilising force in the political process (76), by 
providing common ground for the disputants (79). Ellis thinks about how law can retain its 
identity in scientifically complex international environmental regimes. Using a systems 
theoretic approach, she reads Fischer-Lescano and Teubner alongside Koskenniemi, using 
the ‘culture of formalism’ and the ‘constitutional mindset’ to characterise distinctly legal 
operations (100-101). Toope and Brunée use a constructivist approach to extrapolate the 
aforementioned culture of legality.44 Each of these writers sees a future in which 
international law would cease to be determined by certain actors’ ‘material power’ alone 
(147).  
 
For Koskenniemi, these futures might be possible, but they are not plausible. Optimism is a 
high-stakes gamble and the odds are against success, so he demands countervailing reasons 
to displace the presumption of bad faith he attributes to international decision-makers. We 
cannot gather this evidence, however, because we have no ‘psychological access to whether 
something is ‘genuinely’ shared’ (396). The hermeneutics of suspicion dispenses with the 
presumption of innocence and views every untested proposition or ambiguity as a crime 
waiting to be committed. Koskenniemi places the burden of proof on the optimist because 
he expects to encounter hegemony. Against this litany of unredeemed failure, international 
                                                      
41 Michel Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom’ in Paul Rabinow (ed.), 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol 1 Ethics, (Penguin, 1994), 292 
42 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 5 
43 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 130 
44 Above, at s. 2(a)(ii) 
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law’s rap sheet speaks of unequal power relations and façade legitimation, an ever-
accumulating body of corroborating evidence. 
 
A predilection for certain sorts of stories also means that we tend to turn our attention to 
places we expect to find them. Koskenniemi tethers his epilogue to the Transatlantic and 
Transpacific Partnership Treaties (TPP and TTIP), using them as a context in which his 
theories about international law can play out (394). I wonder how many international 
lawyers remain under the spell of these international instruments. Hundreds of us have 
signed letters of protest against the initiative, both in the North America and in Europe.45 
Using TTIP to tell the story of the dangers of international law’s enchanting powers is like 
using the movie Jaws to teach beach safety. International law is, undeniably, riven with 
violence and unacknowledged crimes – but these crimes are only some of the stories we can 
tell about it.  
 
3. Characterising the critical professional 
 
Koskenniemi is the principal victim of his own antinormative normativity. It hollows out his 
call for institutionalised international lawyers to exercise moral agency in their work and 
take responsibility for the decisions they make and the advice they give. How can 
international lawyers incorporate the sorts of reflective practices this would presumably 
require in their working lives? What if their gut feelings told them to prioritise national or 
institutional concerns? How is reflective responsibility different from compliant – forgive me 
- responsibilisation? Koskenniemi does not answer these questions, but we can infer the 
responses he might give from his adherence to the norms of suspicious critique. 
 
In this section, I use Koskenniemi’s anti-normative normativity to substantiate the morally 
responsible, emotionally literate international lawyering he advocates. The figure that 
emerges from this reading is, to adopt Sahib Singh’s apt label, the critical professional. An 
individual caught between institutional belonging and independent agency, not ‘the critic as 
intellectual’, but a projection thereof (198). Koskenniemi wants to make critical 
professionals of international lawyers working in institutions. While he seems to have 
courts, tribunals, inter-governmental organisations and the like in mind, we should also 
remember that academics are institutionalised, too – in universities, societies and through 
research programming. If ‘international law is what international lawyers do and how they 
think’,46 it will remain enchanted until all international lawyers embrace suspicious ways of 
seeing. 
                                                      
45 For North America, see ‘An open letter about investor-state dispute settlement’ (April 2015) at 
 https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter; for Europe see, https://stop-ttip.org/blog/legal-
statement-on-investment-protection-in-ttip-and-ceta/ (URLs last accessed 10 April 2018) 
46 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of International Law as 
Practice’ in Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Adviser of International Organizations and 
Practitioners in the Field of International Law (United Nations, 1999) 523 
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The epilogue is the latest in a long line of attempts to say more about how we should use 
international law in order to further emancipatory projects and avoid supporting hegemonic 
ones. The key to all the ideas is that international law actors must exercise moral 
responsibility by acting self-consciously and reflecting on the politics of their work. One, the 
constitutional mind-set, means focusing on the ‘the practice of professional judgment’, 
irrespective of functional interests.47 Another, the culture of formalism, denotes ‘a culture 
of resistance to power, a social practice of accountability, openness, and equality whose 
status cannot be reduced to the political positions of any one of the parties’ involved.48 The 
epilogue introduces the idea of that the engine of moral agency is the ‘gut feeling’ (411) of 
the individual international lawyer – a ‘fleeting sensation’ of injustice. Koskenniemi supports 
this intuition by referring to Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments (410). 
 
Who is this individual who exercises professional judgment in a way that resists power and 
is driven by emotional instinct? Koskenniemi swathes them in so many gauzy layers of 
misdirection that they escape our intellectual grasp. His strategy is to preserve moral agency 
from suspicion by making the idea elusive and insubstantial, and he cradles a vision of hope 
that is allusive rather than abstract – perceptible only as ‘fleeting sensations’, a phrase 
echoed by some of the contributors.49 Koskenniemi gestures his intentions and avoids 
packaging this ideas in easily abstractable language. His ideas are revealed obscurely - 
carefully coded messages to like-minded lawyers. The absence of a ready label in the new 
epilogue suggests that Koskenniemi has been burned by the widespread take-up of ‘the 
culture of formalism’, including by ‘reactionary jurists’, a worry he discusses in his interview 
with Obregón (384).  
 
Such fears are understandable, but not even naming his politically-engaged, emotionally-
aware moral agent of an international lawyer undermines the critically transformative 
power of the idea. This anonymous aspiration is hope incognito, a figure that will only be 
recognised by those already in-the-know. Gregor Noll puts a gentler spin on this, suggesting 
Koskenniemi ‘may be understood to eliminate creation while retaining redemption as a 
transcendent source of normativity’ (23). In an attempt to reclaim this power, I lend 
Koskenniemi’s figure a name and a face and the rest of the essay draws on literary fiction to 
characterise these critical professionals. 
 
a) Reclaiming critique 
 
                                                      
47 Koskenniemi, n 9 above, 18 
48 Koskenniemi, n 8 above, 500 
49 Koskenniemi uses it at 410. Noll (33) and Singh (198) both refer to it. 
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In his ‘excavation’ of the critical professional, a version of an essay also published in the 
Leiden Journal of International Law,50 Singh makes a doubly suspicious reading of 
Koskenniemi’s work to present a critical subject precisely recalling Felski’s idea of the critic 
as detective, who gets their insight by standing back in, as Singh puts it following Sartre, an 
‘interrogative attitude’ (203). This subject is produced, sustained and tormented by certain 
antinomies which make this attitude possible (198). Negations, he explains, lead to 
‘frustration, anxiety and anguish’ by sustaining a ‘kernel of nothingness’ in the critic’s heart, 
which detaches them from the world (205). Using Sartre and then Barthes, Singh digs down 
into Koskenniemi’s writing to unearth the dangerous nature of Koskenniemi’s critical 
subject. Firstly, these subjects risk ‘perpetuat[ing] and reproduc[ing] the very ideology of 
liberalism that it seeks to challenge’ and secondly, they resist exposure because of the 
myths that entrench and reproduce them (212-215). 
 
Singh’s critique is scholarly and sharp, but, as suspicion is wont to do, it lays waste to all 
before it. I wonder if we can rehabilitate the critical professional. Can we say more about 
this figure, rather than writing them off as one of critique’s usual suspects? Embodying the 
critical professional calls for some creative thinking. Koskenniemi makes the task especially 
difficult by leaving scant clues for us to go on, living up to Sedgwick’s description of the 
mimetic nature of such critique, which always seeks to remain above suspicion.51 Embarking 
on this challenge, I pack away the tools of high theory and take some inspiration from 
literary criticism, instead. I am not looking for a pinioned subject, but a living character. I 
turn to fiction in order to put meat on its bones, bringing moral agency to life in the form of 
a fictional character – the maverick cop. Like Koskenniemi’s responsible international 
lawyer, the maverick cop is a critical professional: an insider with critical purchase on their 
institution. 
 
Fiction is a privileged medium that can put feelings into words in ways that capture 
ambivalence and elusiveness – good fiction is not point-and-click description. Given the 
importance that Koskenniemi attaches to sentiments and, for some time, sensibilities, it 
seems a promising place to look for ways of talking about unobservable, personal affective 
phenomena. For Koskenniemi, sensibility is a matter of ‘both ideas and practices, but also 
involves broader aspects of the political faith, image and self, as well as the structural 
constraints within which international law professionals live and work’.52 Fictions help us 
think about the internal, as well as extant aspects of sensibility and offer us, perhaps, the 
‘alternative vocabularies’ that Koskenniemi hopes will help us escape ‘the pure immanence 
[of systems] that are professional talk all the way down’ (411). 
 
                                                      
50 Sahib Singh, ‘Martti Koskenniemi: Theories and Images of the International Lawyer’ (2016) 29(3) LJIL 699-
726 
51 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 131-133 
52 Koskenniemi, n 8 above, 2 
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In pursuing this creative line of critique, I aim engaged in an act of reclamation.53 I read 
Koskenniemi’s work reparatively, as Sedgwick counsels – not in order to reconstruct his 
meaning or to return to some original meaning,54 but to move beyond the paralysis of 
suspicion. The reparative impulse is ‘additive and accretive’ because it wants to ‘assemble 
and confer plenitude on an object that will then have resources to offer an inchoate self’.55 
This is a matter of ‘seeking pleasure’ rather than ‘forestalling pain’, not on the grounds that 
the former is truer than the latter – but that neither motive for action can claim to be truer 
than the other.56 The pleasure sought here is Orford’s ‘enlivening, productive and critically 
transformative’ development of international law towards a less repressive future.57 
 
Fictions help us to release critical professionals from specific contexts without trying to pull 
the wool over anyone’s eyes. I am emboldened to do this by two of the contributions to the 
collection under review, both of which break ideas out of their contextual prisons. Marks 
and Lang draw on Walter Benjamin and Marilyn Strathern ‘to fan the spark of hope’ they 
see in Koskenniemi’s work, freeing the sensibilities of disciplinary heroes like Hersch 
Lauterpacht and Wolfgang Friedmann from their historical moment by way of mimesis and 
improvised performance. In his essay, Gregor Noll makes a cheeky, context-busting move by 
comparing Koskenniemi to the Jesuit thinker Erich Przywara. He does not make a suspicious 
reading and there is no big reveal in which Koskenniemi is unmasked as a closet Catholic, 
rather Noll tries to understand what is going on in Koskenniemi’s work on legal 
argumentation. By putting Koskenniemi’s ideas in dialogue with others, both contributions 
make creative critiques of Koskenniemi’s work, ones which enable his ideas and do not shut 




Fiction is a tool to think with,58 but not one that necessarily yields answers – we should not 
start scouring novels for blueprints of international order. Domestic lawyers are (fairly) 
comfortable with expedient fictions.59 Fictions can be used as placeholders to allow legal 
reasoning to continue in conditions of imperfect knowledge or to circumnavigate ‘the 
obstinacy of reality’.60 I want to put fiction to more critical work. Can it help us to 
understand as yet unspoken, unforeseen or unconsidered aspects of propositions about 
international law or, in Koskenniemi’s case, international lawyers? Three features of fiction 
                                                      
53 For more on the importance of creativity for international lawyers see, Isobel Roele, ‘The Making of 
International Lawyers’ in Hohmann and Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects (OUP, 2018) 
54 Sedgwick, n 2 above, 128 
55 ibid, 149 
56 ibid, 137-138 
57 Above, s. 2(a)(i) 
58 Joshua Landy, How to Do Things with Fictions (OUP, 2012) 
59 As pointed out by Gallagher, 348. See generally, Del Mar and Twining (eds), Legal Fictions in Theory and 
Practice (Springer, 2015) 
60 Del Mar, ibid, ix 
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suggest it might be able to play such a role. The first has to do with its context-transcending 
properties, the second with its complicated relation to truth and the third with the non-
referentiality of its characters. 
 
Koskenniemi’s ideal international lawyers get stuck in their contexts. Fiction offers a way to 
release the sensibility Koskenniemi wishes to inculcate without conjuring the particularities 
of men like Friedmann and Lauterpacht into abstract rules of general practice. Fictions, as 
Felski shows, transcend contexts – we can ‘feel solicited, buttonholed, stirred up, by words 
drafted eons ago’ and experience ‘flashes of transtemporal connection and unexpected 
illumination’.61 While recognising the usefulness of contextual thinking, Felski wants to 
avoid incarcerating meaning in the past because it does not allow us to think about why and 
how past texts speak to us now.62 She suggests that the contextualising force of historicism 
serves a similar role to cultural relativism – ‘quantifying difference’ and denying 
relatedness’.63 Cautiously, then, we might expand her unboxing exercise to other forms of 
contextual thinking. International law has myriad schemata for contextualising: cultural, 
functional, procedural, institutional – to name just a few. Fiction might help us unpack 
international law concepts by moving them beyond a given context. Unlike the multi-author 
chain novel that Ronald Dworkin used to explain the coherence of case-by-case legal 
reasoning,64 the work of unpacking is not about justifying or criticising uses of international 
legal decisions, but about understanding the potential of ideas.  
 
The second feature of fiction is that it is a form of untruth, but it is not out to deceive. Sir 
Philip Sidney understood that some untruths ‘nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth’, 
as Catherine Gallagher wrote in her essay, ‘The Rise of Fictionality’.65 Gallagher investigates 
a change in the meaning of fictionality during the mid-eighteenth century, when the novel 
emerged as a particular kind of fiction. The novel ‘is not just one kind of fictional narrative 
among others; it is the kind in which and through which fictionality became manifest, 
explicit, widely understood, and accepted’.66 Novelistic fictions are made up, to be sure, but 
they are not make-believe. Gallagher shows how the novel came into being through a 
complicated play of imagination and realism which, eventually, readers came to recognise 
as a category of untruth that was neither fact nor deception.67 Novels emerged as 
‘believable stories that did not solicit belief’.68  
 
                                                      
61 Felski, n 3 above, 155 
62 ibid, 157 
63 ibid, 156 
64 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard UP, 1986) 228-238 
65 Catherine Gallagher, ‘The Rise of Fictionality’ in Franco Moretti (ed.) The Novel, Vol. 1 (Princeton UP, 2006) 
336-363, 337 quoting Sir Philip Sidney, ‘The Defense of Poesy’ in The Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney (CUP, 
1962), 29 
66 ibid, 337 
67 ibid, 338 
68 ibid, 340 
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We have no mode of declared untruth in international law – is and ought statements alike 
make truth claims. In a post-fact world, we are out of step with the times. Domestic lawyers 
have developed more sophisticated ways of relating to truth. According to William Twining, 
Bentham’s view that fictions are ‘wicked falsehoods’ is unheard of in domestic common 
law.69 Lon Fuller, for one, thought the utility of a fiction depended on the user’s 
consciousness of its falsity.70 At the risk of taking these uses of fiction out of context, I 
venture to suggest that international law could cultivate a capacity to appreciate untruths as 
such, too.71  
 
Fictional characters are a particular instance of the complication of fantasy and reality in 
fictions. Gallagher explains how the novel developed non-referential characters, ones that 
are not thinly veiled ciphers for real people, and which enabled a referentiality greater than 
any individual.72 She quotes Charles Grivel, ‘le personnage…n’est personne’.73 Embracing 
this approach would make it possible to characterise the culture of formalism without, for 
example, walling Friedmann up in his historical context, as Koskenniemi does in his 
epilogue.74 A novel’s characters transcend their fictional context every time a reader, 
embedded in their own context, sympathises with, identifies with, or judges a character.  
 
This third feature of fictions flows from the way they refer to reality without making truth 
claims about it. This involves two intertwined movements, one on the part of the fiction and 
one on the part of the reader. Gallagher explains how fictions developed from being 
characteristically fantastic (incredibility meant they were readily distinguishable from 
deceptions) to being characteristically probable, bearing a greater resemblance to reality. 
Readers developed a parallel capacity to engage with fiction – disbelief was a condition of 
the increasing believability of novels. Gallagher shows how readers adopted attitudes of 
‘ironic credulity enabled by optimistic incredulity’.75 Engaging with fiction is not a matter of 
being blindly immersed or ironically detached. The reader retains their critical faculties 
insofar as they understand themselves to be engaged with a work of fiction.  
 
Fiction does not suspend critique, but demands it. The critical reader’s disposition cannot, 
however, be suspicious. Active disbelief erects a barrier between the reader and the fiction, 
partitioning off fantasy from reality, lest the world be enchanted by misleading fictions. The 
value of fiction is that it treats fantasy as an invitation to explore and not an imperative to 
foreclose consideration – untruth is not always deceptive and enchanting. Fictional 
characters are nonreferential, but not insubstantial and they transcend their fictional 
                                                      
69 Del Mar and Twining, n 59 above, vii 
70 Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford UP, 1967) 
71 See also Roele, n 53 above  
72 Gallagher, n 65 above, 342 
73 ibid, 351 
74 Above, at 2(a)(ii) 
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contexts as rounded individuals who invite critical engagement, not abstract subjects that 
repel it. Fictions might prompt us to acquit or convict, to criticise or justify – either or both. 
Moreover, fictional contexts are not exclusive and do not have the final say on whatever 
international law ideas we may read through or alongside them. I read Koskenniemi’s work 
alongside David Simon and Ed Burns’ HBO TV series The Wire. Other tropes in different 
stories would, of course, yield alternative analyses. I lift characters out of the fictionalised 
context of Baltimore at the turn of the Millennium and draw them across contextual 
boundaries into present day international law. My aim is to show that fiction helps us ‘to 
think about the power and limits of [international lawyers’] professional commitments and 
the role of moral and political responsibility’ (405). In reading Koskenniemi’s critical 
professionals as maverick cops, I am not trying to tell the whole truth about them. I am 
trying to build an understanding of what it means to be a critical professional. It is an 
approach to critical reading that looks a text in the eye and spends time attending to its 
implications, however discomfiting, unexpected or inconvenient these turn out to be, over 
suspicious techniques that turn away, having already dismissed them as dangerous.  
 
Calling on the maverick cop to understand Koskenniemi’s critical professional tinkers slightly 
with Felski’s resort to detective fiction to describe the imaginary of the critic. Here, we are 
in the realms of the police procedural and not the whodunit. The detective is not a brilliant 
amateur like Sherlock Holmes, Miss Marple or Lord Peter Wimsey, or a private dick like 
Philip Marlowe or Jessica Jones. Instead, they are marginal figures within an institution, 
professionals not amateurs. Maverick cops come in many shapes and sizes – from Columbo, 
the shambling working-class detective who sees through the glamour of the LA glitterati, to 
Inspector Morse, an Oxford drop-out who cannot be conned by the dons he investigates, 
and Stella Gibson, who faces down the patriarchy in Northern Ireland, maverick detectives 
are suspicious of authority and do their jobs all the better for it.  
 
As critical professionals, maverick cops present appealing characters whose lives we might 
not want to emulate, but whose unsentimental compassion and dedication suggest a 
professional balancing act that is otherwise difficult to pull off. They enjoy what Felski calls a 
‘halo effect’, an ‘aura of rigour and probity that burnishes its dissident stance with a 
normative glow’.76 The maverick cop embodies, to borrow a phrase from Foucault, ‘the art 
of voluntary inservitude, of reflective indocility’.77 This character recognises, like 
Koskenniemi’s critical international lawyer, that ‘the progress we hope for is not within the 
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The maverick cop, like the critical professional international lawyer, is able to work within 
an institution without adopting its structural biases, always conscious of the option of acting 
otherwise than protocol demands.  Constitutionally suspicious of bosses, this character’s 
disposition recalls the attitude of suspicious critique where,78 
 
[d]istrust of one’s betters is signalled via oblique looks and knowing 
grimaces…a form of critique that is voiced offstage, muttered behind the 
backs of a more dominant group. 
 
Instead of blindly following orders, maverick cops exercise a version of ‘responsible agency’ 
(398). Moral sensibilities guide their work, creating, if not Kantian moral politicians, then 
moral professionals who exercise judgment ‘which is neither rationally subsumed under a 
rule nor a fully subjective expression of emotion’.79 Like the international lawyer with moral 
agency, this character constantly renegotiates their loyalties against institutional bias (397) 
by following a hunch and trusting their gut. 
 
Central to the maverick cop’s identity is a willingness to say no and act otherwise than the 
system directs. Writing elsewhere, Koskenniemi has noted,80 
 
In a world where every influential institution preaches for consensus, the 
power of negativity remains a vital force while calls for consensus and 
harmony, especially when preached from above, are equal to “shut up”. 
 
Reserving the right to say no, international lawyers walk a line between being a cog in the 
machine and being a spanner in the works. 
 
As viewers, we trust maverick cops to break the rules or disobey orders. What is it about the 
maverick cop that sets them apart from that other mainstay of the police procedural, the 
corrupt cop? Why do we root for Idris Elba’s John Luther, even though he beats up suspects 
and works with a serial killer? Maverick cops are often, sad love lives and alcoholism 
notwithstanding, exceptionally competent. Think of Lester Freamon in The Wire deciding, 
against orders, to follow drug money as well as drug violence, and combing the archives 
rigorously, methodically, patiently to create a paper-trail that leads directly to City Hall. 
Many of these characters are also profoundly committed to their profession, which they 
seek to redeem from a corrupt institution. Sometimes the corruption is the criminal 
corruption of a Serpico, but more often cops, like Colin Dexter’s Inspector Morse, buck 
against restrictive red tape and protocol that threaten to derail a promising line of 
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investigation. Mutual mistrust of management, then, is a common trait for maverick cops 




Often the gap between being committed to one’s profession and being institutionalised is 
illustrated by the maverick cop’s experience and institutional knowledge. Detective 
Freamon, for instance, served out 13 desk-bound years in Baltimore PD’s pawnshop unit 
until he became part of the institutional furniture and his insubordination was forgotten. His 
relationship with Jimmy McNulty, a younger detective, is instructive. Freamon predicts that 
McNulty, whose bloodhound instincts and disdain for authority are marinated in whiskey, 
will attract the ire of his superiors and offers stringent counsel when he thinks McNulty goes 
too far. The accolade ‘natural po-leece’ is bestowed or withheld and always intoned with a 
reverence that harks back to a tradition that speaks of, in Marks and Lang’s terms, 
‘exemplary forerunners, the ancestors on whom we should model ourselves’ (332). The 
maverick cop can, in this way, help Koskenniemi distinguish between those with a respect 
for tradition and agents of ‘moralist conservatism’ who fetishise ‘former times’ (398).  
 
Instead, the trope enacts Marks and Lang’s notion that the past is ‘a force to be felt, a secret 
sympathy to be sensed’ (335) and not a Human Resources training manual. They show how, 
in writing episodes from the lives of luminaries like Lauterpacht and Friedmann, 
Koskenniemi does not urge us to reenact their careers, so much as show us how tradition 
can be handed down in a ‘flash’ of recognition without being overcome by conformism 
(321-323). As they point out, there is a tone of nostalgia about this, a homesickness that 
comes ‘from feelings of loss and estrangement’ (327). These feelings need not dissuade us 
from trying to emulate great men whose times have passed. Instead, they prompt us to 
recognise that life has moved on when we are inspired by them to make our ‘improvised 
performances’ (335). 
 
We see this sort of improvisation in the work of the maverick cop. They reject protocols and 
use old techniques handed down by their mentors to feel out a crime scene rather than 
analysing it at a distance. In interpreting the sense-data they receive, maverick cops use 
their sensibilities as much as their cognitive faculties. These practices are not taught in 
training college, but picked up on-the-job. There is no training manual, for instance, that 
describes McNulty and Bunk Moreland’s sensational, monosyllabic recreation of a crime in 
the first season of The Wire, or Kima Greggs’ reconstruction of an alley-way shooting in 
Season Four. Greggs learns her careful, close attention from the experienced homicide 
detective Moreland, who explains the technique in two words - ‘soft eyes’ – and invokes no 
detailed methodology at all. These detectives do not stand back for clearer insights, they 
inhabit the space of investigation, decoding the scene of the crime with their sensibilities as 
Forthcoming, 2018 Accepted Version Modern Law Review 
 21 
well as their reason. A similar kind of embodied thinking and perspicacity is suggested by 




For all their competence and regret that the profession has been managerialised, mavericks 
never become new brooms – imagine Freamon on a leadership and management course. 
Disdaining the greasy pole of promotion allows him to say quietly, firmly and repeatedly ‘no, 
I will not’. By contrast, career-minded Cedric Daniels contemplates leaving the Baltimore PD 
for the bar when he falls foul of management. If Daniels recalls the well-meaning 
mainstream, Freamon resembles the critic. Koskenniemi’s approach to transforming 
international lawyers into good critics confines them to the same sort of case-by-case 
approach that only allows maverick cops to make progress within the space of an episode. 
For Koskenniemi, ‘the injustice of the world is a product of its ruling symbolic order and 
therefore cannot be treated by it’ (411). The implication is that there is no point in 
reforming the system – the most you can do is learn to play it. 
 
This reading of the maverick cop/critical international lawyer brings to mind Felski’s insight 
that ‘the imagined location of critique…is elsewhere: outside, below, in the margins, at the 
borders’.81 A transformative project or a reclamatory critique is the last thing the maverick 
would offer – to do so would be to centralise critique. In contrast to the maverick cop’s 
peripheral noncompliance, Bunny Colvin’s Hamsterdam project – he is a district commander 
in the Baltimore PD who corrals the drug trade in a brown-bag zone when his frustration 
with Comstat’s metrics reaches tipping point – takes on the system. The project teeters on a 
knife-edge of praise or blame; does it reduce drug violence, or does it condone drug use? 
Under the glare of media suspicion, Colvin cannot fail to lose and is ousted from the police 
force. Ending years of steadfast service in ignominy, the scheme exposed the pathologies of 
the War on Drugs in a way that McNulty and Freamon’s low-level insubordination could not 
hope to approach. The trouble with suspicious critique is that, in Orford’s words, its 
‘relentlessly negative operation’ is no response to ‘neo-liberal political culture that depends 
upon cynical reason for its consolidation and expansion’ (309). The institution churns on, 
absorbing the maverick cop as an anomaly. 
 
As Singh insightfully describes the critical subject, so the maverick cop ‘lives an essentially 
unhappy and constantly burdened existence, who can always realize his free choice, all the 
whilst knowing that any freedom can only ever be fleeting’ (207). The maverick cop is a 
character who can only make progress within the space of an episode and the critical 
international lawyer is only allowed to be progressive within a given case. Creativity is 
contained in tightly circumscribed contexts. Critical professionals do nothing to reclaim their 
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institutions, instead reliving the eternal recurrence of the same, series in and series out. 
Written by an ex-homicide detective and an ex-Baltimore journalist, The Wire is unlike most 
police procedurals in this respect. It cleaves much closer to reality than other fictions – it is 
even set on sociology courses. The net effect is not to dull our critical faculties, but to 
sharpen them. It demands political engagement from its audience, as cases overflow series, 
tangling up plotlines and enmeshing the viewer in the richly drawn life of Baltimore. The 
show places its maverick cops in a single unfolding and complex plot, removing them from 
the usual endless parade of boxsets in which nothing ever changes but the crime itself and 
the alimony demands of the protagonist’s ex-wife.  
 
The characters of McNulty and Freamon suggest how the unboxed, longue durée narrative 
space tested the limits of the maverick cop’s ability to live with the future anterior tense of 
suspicious critique.82 In the final season of The Wire, the pair embark on a hair-brained 
scheme to save their Major Crimes investigation from being shut down by the bosses. They 
want systemic change. They want to be able to pursue long-range, slow-moving 
investigations without being pressed to produce short-term gains to boost department 
metrics. But they do not fight to change the system. Instead, they limit their intervention to 
the context of a specific case, creating a fake serial killer that they can pretend to 
investigate in order to justify their wire-tap. In allowing the characters’ frustration with the 
system to build over five seasons, Simon and Burns reveal the limitations of the maverick 
cop as figure for the ideal international lawyer.  
 
The storyline is a shark-jumping moment that encapsulates the frustration of a critical 
professionalism which moves endlessly from case to case without ever engaging the meta-
structures. The scheme seems equally admirable and ridiculous. It narrates the unending 
struggle of resistance in a much less heroic register than the ones with which we critical 
international lawyers might prefer to associate ourselves. Critical professionalism can be 
bathetic as well as effortful and noble. Good fiction offers us ways of thinking with 
ambivalence and not against it. Like Simon and Burns’ work, it offers neither easy answers 





Suspicious critique shuts down enlivening, transformative and productive international law 
work in international organisations, courts and universities alike. International law’s future 
is always already determined. Operating in the future anterior, suspicion declares that 
international law will have been part of the problem and refuses to countenance any but 
the bleakest narratives, lest international lawyers be blinded into complacency by the 
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glimmer of hope. Without doubt, we need to exercise caution in international law 
scholarship – when we check under the bed, we often find a bogeyman there - but suspicion 
need not be our only mode of scholarship. 
 
We need more creative projects for critical minds, ones that enable us to encounter 
ambivalence, not avoid it. As the editors of the present volume write, ‘international law is 
(also) the product of the imagination of international lawyers’ (3). Koskenniemi seems to 
imagine a future for international law in which lawyers are critically engaged professionals, 
grappling with the structural bias of their institutions one case at a time. Suspicious critique 
fears that, unmoored from a specific context, concepts become abstract and available for 
conservative purposes as well as progressive ones, and so it boxes them up tight in strict 
contexts from which they cannot escape. The intimation of any trans-contextual thread is so 
fragile that the weight of suspicion’s direct gaze snaps it. Only the initiated can detect it 
from the corner of the eye or as ‘a fleeting sensation’. Fiction gives us trans-temporal 
contexts and non-referential characters, which enable us to think about an idea in three 
dimensions. Good fiction lets us explore ambivalence with an attitude of ‘ironic credulity’, 
which is neither blind immersion nor forensic detachment. 
